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THE FACE OF DIGNITY: PRINCIPLED
OVERSIGHT OF BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION
Rhonda Gay Hartman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Human dignity is intangible, yet luminous. Like opening
a window in a dark room, dignity enables us to see our selves
intuitively, our existence and evolution.' It illuminates our
pathway into the future-a future unimaginable prior to bio-
scientific innovations that challenge the formerly universal
concepts of "human" and "person." Sustaining human dignity
for generations to come is an imperative.
Several generations ago, in a much simpler time, the
Supreme Court recognized the struggle "to achieve human
dignity in a society so largely affected by technological
advances."2 Far beyond the technological advances then
confronting the Court, today's bio-scientific innovations
present the prospect of irrevocably altering humanity's
unique attributes and imperiling its essence, not by frontal
assault, but by incremental approaches. Chimera and cloning
* Correspondence concerning this Essay may be sent to Professor Hartman at
the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, hartmanr@pitt.edu, where she
is affiliated with the Center for Bioethics and Health Law.
Engagements for discussing the ideas expressed in this Essay through
interviews and presentations were graciously extended to me by National Public
Radio, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and the Universit6 Pierre et Marie
Curie (Paris VI). I am grateful for the privilege to participate in this dialogue.
It has enriched my thinking about dignity as far more than an eloquent
expression. Dignity enables us-and engenders an intelligence that both
inspires and inscribes the whole of humanity.
1. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 44 (Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press 1971) ("There is no reason to suppose that we can avoid all
appeals to intuition, of whatever kind, or that we should try to.").
2. Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 542 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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research perplex us with problems of morality,3 scientific
inquiry,4  constitutionality,5  and patentability.6  Dramatic
advances in neuroscience 7 in conjunction with the emergence
of "neuroethics"8 are capturing public attention.9 Questions
regarding "immortality" raised by nanotechnology and a
research agenda for life-span longevity are inescapable.1"
Among the challenges we face in this century are determining
what it means to be human and how biomedical science
should be guided so as to not fundamentally alter that
meaning and the ethic of reverence underlying it.
Confronting these challenges requires a frame of
reference for analyzing them. Developing a frame of
3. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN
DIGNITY: AN ETHICAL INQUIRY 117-70 (2002),
http://bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/pcbe-cloning-report.pdf.
4. See Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review
Boards, in SUPREME COURT REVIEW 271 (Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds.,
2005).
5. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone?, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 987 (2002).
6. See Thomas D. Mays, Biotech Incites Outcry: Public Policy Debates Arise
Over Human-Animal Hybrid Patents and Germline Therapy, NAT'L L.J., June
22, 1998, at C1. For treatment of the wide-ranging issues, including patent law
concerns, raised by cell admixture research, see Nicole E. Kopinski, Note,
Human-Nonhuman Chimeras: A Regulatory Proposal on the Blurring of Species
Lines, 45 B.C. L. REV. 619 (2004).
7. See, e.g., ERIC R. KANDEL, IN SEARCH OF MEMORY: THE EMERGENCE OF
A NEW SCIENCE OF MIND (2006); MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN
(2005); EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE (1998).
8. See generally NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY (Judy Illes ed., 2006).
9. See, e.g., Jay Tolson, Is There Room for the Soul: New Challenges to Our
Most Cherished Beliefs About Self and the Human Spirit, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Oct. 23, 2006, at 56; Michael S. Gazzaniga, Henry T. Greely
& William Safire, Neuroscience, Ethics and the Law, Debate at A Slippery
Slope: Facts, Ethics and Policy Guiding Neuroscience Today (May 10, 2005)
(transcript available at
http:/www.nyas.orgpublications/readersreport.asp?articleID=34&pages=2)
(hereinafter Neuroscience transcript). See also infra notes 159-62 and
accompanying text.
10. See Daniel Callahan, Death and the Research Imperative, 342 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 654, 654 (2000) ("Hardly anyone speaks openly of immortality as the
aim, but that is beside the point; it is built into the research imperative.");
Thomas Bartlett, The Man Who Would Murder Death: A Rogue Researcher
Challenges Scientists to Reverse Human Aging, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct.
28, 2005, at A15 ("[Gerontologists] shy away from talk about life extension or
'curing' aging and prefer to focus on keeping older people healthy for as long as
possible, a goal referred to in the discipline as 'compression of morbidity' or
'healthspan.'"); see also infra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
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reference through which careful analysis yields thoughtful
response is no easy task, but it is a necessary undertaking.
Biomedical innovation captivates us; it also confuses us." It
now compels us to not transform the human state in ways
that disregard dignity. A conceptual framework centered on
dignity can illuminate how we think about biomedical
innovation and clarify its implications. This framework
should guide biomedical advances and uses. 2  Stated
differently, dignity should be the star by which science and
society steer, rather than the maypole around which ethical,
policy, and legal issues dance after bio-scientific innovation
has moved forward and been unleashed.
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held
that a right to dignity exists, the language of its opinions
solidifies dignity's role as a sacrosanct shield against
derogating encroachments of humanity."i This suggests that
a dignity-centered framework is critical to overseeing
biomedical innovation.14  By developing the idea of dignity
and offering insights into dignity's importance in legal policy
11. See Alexander Morgan Capron, "So Quick Bright Things Come to
Confusion," 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 169, 169 (1987) (drawing upon William
Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream to describe "the remarkable fruits
of biomedicine, from research to health care delivery, that have produced the
rich harvest of ethical, social and legal issues that have drawn our, and
society's, attention").
12. See Richard Horton, Rediscovering Human Dignity, 364 LANCET 1081,
1085 (2004) ("Taking account of human dignity as the over-riding requirement
for a decent society might encourage us to reassess what we mean when we
speak of improving global human health and advancing human development.
The notion of dignity could prove to be a valuable catalyst for such a revision of
thought.").
13. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489
U.S. 46 (1989); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Am. Fed'n of
Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 542 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26-41 (1946) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
14. While I maintain that dignity should be developed as the basis for
permitting or proscribing uses of bio-scientific advances, George J. Annas
argues that, in order to "tame our tendency toward genocide and to prevent
species suicide," international rules are needed against actions that threaten
the integrity of the human species, such as genetic engineering, human/machine
cyborgs, xenografts, artificial organs and brain alterations, all of which could fit
"into a new category of 'crimes against humanity' in the strict sense." George J.
Annas, The Man on the Moon, Immortality, and Other Millennial Myths: The
Prospects and Perils of Human Genetic Engineering, 49 EMORY L.J. 753, 778-79
(2000).
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analysis, this Essay provides a framework for contemplating
issues presented by biomedical advances and considering
whether a particular advance imperils essential aspects of
humankind.15
Moral thought and the ability to analyze and anticipate
the future obligate the public to collaborate with biomedical
science to direct and delineate the uses of innovation while
preserving humankind's constituents. 6 In discharging this
obligation, our collective conscience should neither be
antithetical to the benefits of scientific inquiry nor shirk the
responsibility to preserve the constituents required for our
species' survival. 7 In other words, public deliberation is
needed to supervise and steer bio-scientific progress that
increasingly challenges what it means to be human.
This Essay highlights the importance of a dignity-
centered policy analysis for biomedical progress by examining
a revolutionary advance-transplanting a human face. 8 Part
II explains why dignity deserves attention by addressing its
place in philosophy, public policy, and law. Parts III and IV
discuss paradigms for personal dignity and dignity for
15. See B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 54 (1971) (comparing
the struggle for dignity to a struggle for freedom in its significance); see also
DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, HUMAN DIGNITY IN BIOETHICS
AND BIOLAW 2 (2001) (concluding that "a defensible understanding of respect for
human dignity is a challenge within practical (and particularly moral) reason");
Richard E. Ashcroft, Making Sense of Dignity, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 679, 679-80
(2005) (contending that dignity is "worth exploring in more detail"); Horton
supra note 12, at 1081 (suggesting a reconfiguration of dignity as "the study of
social relations among human beings and the concepts and values that underpin
those relations").
16. Emile Durkheim eloquently elaborated on this theme:
Thus, the antithesis between science and ethics, that formidable
argument with which the mystics of all times have wished to cloud
reason, disappears. To regulate our relations with men, it is not
necessary to resort to any other means than those which we use to
govern our relations with things; thought, methodically employed, is
sufficient in both cases. What reconciles science and ethics is the
science of ethics, for at the same time it teaches us to respect moral
reality, it gives us the means to improve it.
Emile Durkheim, Moral Obligation, Duty and Freedom, in EMILE DURKHEIM:
SELECTED WRITINGS 121 (Anthony Giddens ed. & trans., 1972).
17. See PAUL RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL
160 (1970) (foreboding "suicide of the species").
18. See Susan Okie, Brave New Face, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 889 (2006); The
United States Position: Position Paper of the American Society for Reconstructive
Microsurgery on Facial Transplantation, 99 S. MED. J. 430, 430 (2006)
(hereinafter United States Position).
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humanity. Part IV also illuminates the broader public policy
challenges presented by biomedical innovations and why
dignity must be central to directing their course.
Dignity denotes both reverence and reserve in this
context: 19 reverence for constituents distinct to our species,
and reserve in moving forward with biomedical advances,
particularly when uses could elementally change those
constituents. An overarching inquiry of whether progress
should be permitted or proscribed invites finely-grained
scrutiny of whether and how a specific biomedical advance
should be used.
II. WHY DIGNITY AND WHY Now?
From transplanting embryonic stem cells into humans to
transplanting human faces onto them, bio-scientific strides
benefit us while potentially dispossessing us of essential
aspects of our shared existence and survival. Put differently,
how do we avoid becoming vulnerable to our own
innovations?" Dignity is a compass by which to navigate
biomedical progress. Dignity, the singular concept of
universal human respect, provides a principled basis for
analyzing the unprecedented challenges posed by biomedical
innovation.2' Although some contend that dignity's ambiguity
makes it unsuitable for analyzing biotechnological advances,22
such contentions fail to appreciate its enduring, innate
19. BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, supra note 15, at 9-47.
20. See Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 542
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting our demonstrative "helplessness" in
a sea of technological advance). See also K. ERIC DREXLER, ENGINES OF
CREATION: THE COMING ERA OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 172-73 (1986) (imagining a
.gray goo" scenario where nanomachines dominate).
21. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721 (1961) (emphasizing the antiquity
of dignity in human existence).
22. See David A. Hyman, Does Technology Spell Trouble with a Capital '7'?:
Human Dignity and Public Policy, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 3, 18 (2003)
("[Elven if some forms of technology could rightly be deemed 'trouble with a
capital T,' human dignity is not an effective policy tool with which to attack that
problem."); Ruth Macklin, Editorial, Dignity is a Useless Concept, 327 BRIT.
MED. J. 1419, 1419-20 (2003) (asserting that appeals to dignity "add nothing"
and that dignity can be eliminated as a concept in medical ethics "without any
loss of content"). But see Ashcroft, supra note 15, at 681 (envisioning dignity as
"a field of enquiry for some years to come" and concluding that "calls for closing
it down as incoherent may be premature"); Horton, supra note 12, at 1081
("[Tihe concept of dignity cannot and, indeed, should not be dismissed quite so
easily.").
2007]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 47
quality in human existence.23 This suggests that dignity
should not be dismissed prematurely; it, at least, deserves
consideration as a potential basis of a normative regime to
resolve unanticipated encroachments on the human species
and on human rights.
The quintessence of human rights,24 dignity is a vague
though powerful concept.25 It shapes constitutional rights,26
standards for bodily invasion,27  government-engineered
classifications,28 judicial processes,29 criminal proceedings"
and punishments.3 Dignity provides the touchstone for
preserving one's reputation, 32  and for protecting one's
23. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 735 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing "the legitimate expectation of every person to innate
human dignity").
24. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 152 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(heralding the "high regard for human dignity which is the proud hallmark of
our law"); see also Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects,
45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2004); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A (III), preamble, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
25. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 656 (2d ed. 1989); see also Delaware
v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 697 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198-99 (1977)).
26. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 721; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958); see
also Paul, 424 U.S. at 734-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (declaring that the
Constitution secures and safeguards the "innate human dignity and sense of
worth" of every person); accord N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
27. See Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 174 (1952).
28. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 537 (2004) (Ginsberg, J.,
concurring) ("Legislation calling upon all government actors to respect the
dignity of individuals with disabilities is entirely compatible with our
Constitution's commitment to federalism, properly conceived."); accord Rice v.
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S.
469 (1989).
29. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005); see also Bloom v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 194, 212 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring) ("It is the progression of history,
and especially the deepening realization of the substance and procedures that
justice and the demands of human dignity require, which has caused this Court
to invest the command of 'due process of law' with increasingly greater
substance.").
30. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 765 (2003); Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337, 343 (1970); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 721; Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S.
1 (1946).
31. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102 (1976); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (describing human dignity as the standard by which
severe punishment is gauged).
32. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (holding that
interests in reputation are at the core of human dignity); Rosenblatt v. Baer,
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judgment regarding medical assistance. 3  Not even the
Commerce Clause exceeds its grasp, as the Supreme Court
demonstrated by vindicating human dignity through
economic channels. 4
Although dignity is central to the analysis of
fundamental rights, the Supreme Court has never explicitly
held that a right to dignity exists.35 The Court has invoked
dignity largely in dictum when recognizing constitutionally
protected interests against actions degrading to humanity. 6
Nevertheless, the Court has made clear that dignity is more
than mere incantation;37 its enduring place in law and public
policy as a sacrosanct shield against derogating
encroachments of humanity is undeniable. So widely
accepted and well understood is dignity that it seems to defy
definition.
It is sensible to think of dignity as self-evident. The
scarcity of literature elaborating on dignity relative to its
ubiquity in human rights discourse reflects this sensibility.
Dignity-like liberty, privacy, and equality-is bandied
about, invoked with platitudinous rather than pinpointed
meaning.3" It defies precision39 and yet remains a steadfast
383 U.S. 75, 92-94 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (clarifying that the
constitutionally protected interest in reputation is "no more than our basic
concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at
the root of any decent system of ordered liberty").
33. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Cruzan
v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
34. See Heart of Atlantic Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
35. As biotechnological advances transgress boundaries of humankind, a
right to dignity could be derived from several amendments found in the federal
Constitution including the Thirteenth Amendment's guarantee against
dehumanization whether from private or public action. For a constitutional
analysis that extrapolates the Thirteenth Amendment's elasticity to another
context, see Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A
Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992).
36. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (privacy); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976) (death penalty); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(custodial interrogation); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (search
and seizure); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (trial by jury); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (investigation methods).
37. See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see also Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 734 (1976); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); Rochin, 342
U.S. 165.
38. Horton, supra note 12, at 1081 (referring to dignity's "linguistic
currency" in advertising and "rhetorical device" in global health). "It is not
surprising, perhaps, that some critics describe dignity as a meaningless slogan."
Id.
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virtue. Dignity unifies us as a species, transcending class and
cultural divides. From this intangible virtue comes the
tangible expression of moral values in a shared existence.4 °
One such value is that humanity is dignity.4'
Timeless philosophical inquiries of "what is man,' 42 and
how to prevent his abolition,43  irretrievable loss," or
conceptual change4 5 are especially relevant. Although the
human species is not static, components that distinguish
humanity ought to be. Dignity's prevalent influence on
human continuity and survival is immeasurable. Early
philosophers wrote about dignity as both an empowerment
and a constraint: humans have an intrinsic moral worth, and
as rational beings we have a duty to safeguard this worth
through abilities to reason.46 Imputed to us as members of
the human species is a deontological responsibility for
preserving and perpetuating dignity for one another.47
Contemporary writings capture this idea of humans' rational
ability that gives rise to a collective conscience 4 and
articulates human good by framing long-term rational
39. See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989) (stating that
dignity's lack of scientific measurability makes it "no less real").
40. MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN:
WITH STRICTURES ON POLITICAL & MORAL SUBJECTS 90 (Charles W. Hagelman,
Jr. ed., Norton 1967) (1792) (assigning value "[tlo comprehend[ing] the moral
duties of life, and in what human virtue and dignity consist").
41. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
96-98 (James W. Elligton trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1981) (1785).
42. See RENA DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS (Laurence J. Lafleur trans., Liberal
Arts Press 1951).
43. See C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN (1947).
44. It is the human condition, to be disinclined to ascribe special meaning to
something until it faces extinction. See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL,
HEGEL AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT: A TRANSLATION OF THE JENA LECTURES ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT (1805-6) (1983).
45. FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (Marianne
Cowan trans., 1955) (1886).
46. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1178b5-30 (Terence Irwin trans.,
Hacket Publishing Co. 1985); KANT, supra note 41, at 96-97.
47. KANT, supra note 41, at 96; WOLLSTONECRAFT, supra note 40, at 39-92;
see also HEGEL, supra note 44; FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, HUMAN ALL
TOO HUMAN (R.J. Hollingdale trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
48. Conscience and the ability to morally reason are also central to
discussions about the relationship between science and religion. See, e.g., David
Van Biema, God vs. Science, TIME, Nov. 13, 2006, at 48; FRANCIS S. COLLINS,
THE LANGUAGE OF GOD: A SCIENTIST PRESENTS EVIDENCE FOR BELIEF (2006);
C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY (Macmillian Publishing Co. 1952).
[Vol: 47
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plans .
Precisely because rationality and moral thought
distinguish humans, dignity is central to analyzing
biotechnological advances. Instrumental to this analysis are
inquiries into whether and how these advances ought to
proceed prior to altering essential aspects of humanity. This
analytical task must not be left for another generation to
develop when it may no longer be possible to do so.50 Facial
transplantation raises the prospect of inalienably altering a
vestige of humanity once considered inseparable and
sacrosanct in shared existence-the human face.
Facial transplants are paradigmatic for considering why
dignity should shape public debate and steer scientific
progress. While facial transplants are revolutionary in
treating disfigurement,51 they implicate a core of our shared
existence-the face, which individualizes and humanizes us.
Although visage, which is intrinsically connected with being
human, has itself eluded inquiry, the very idea of
transplanting faces now compels an inquiry guided by
dignity.
III. DIGNITY FOR PERSONS
Unparalleled strides in biomedical science implicate
dignity by blurring boundaries of personhood that give
meaning to humankind. Those boundaries are transgressed
not by bio-scientific ideas, but by the prospect of potentially
permanent alterations to the essence of humanity.52  One
49. See LEWIS, supra note 43; RAWLS, supra note 1, at 424-33; see also
BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, supra note 15; RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S
DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM (1993); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POsTHUMAN FUTURE:
CONSEQUENCES OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION (2002); LEON R. KASS,
LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR BIOETHICS
(2002); SKINNER, supra note 15, at 54 (observing that literature about dignity
"identifies those who infringe a person's worth, ... describes the practices they
use, and... suggests measures to be taken").
50. See LEWIS, supra note 43, at 83-84; see also LEON R. KASS, TOWARD A
MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 37 (1985) (expressing
our disorientation as to "where we are going" despite being technologically well-
equipped).
51. Robert L. Walton & Scott L. Levin, Face Transplantation: The View
From Duke University and the University of Chicago, 99 S. MED. J. 417 (2006).
52. See George J. Annas, The ABCs of Global Governance of Embryonic
Stem Cell Research: Arbitrage, Bioethics and Cloning, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 489,
20071
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such essence is the human face, a constant in our shared
existence that until now had not been questioned.53 This is so
because the face is often thought of as inseparable from our
state of being.54 Like a headache or heartache, it is one's
alone.
A face is inscribed with an inherent human dignity. It is
the repository of personal particulars associated with image
and identity, selfhood and self-perception.5 The face has, a
fortiori, a moral stature in our humanity." By individuating
and humanizing us, visage exceeds fingerprints or DNA in
differentiating us from one another. 57 While qualities such as
voice, presence, personality, or intellectual curiosity
individuate and make us memorable, the value of a face is
undeniable. Even a disfigured, featureless face individuates
the life within.
Inestimable relief and respect for disfigured persons
arguably justify continued advancements in facial
transplantation.5" Given the symbolic value of the human
face, disfigurement suffered by one person represents a
defacement of humankind that resonates with many on a
personal level.59 Research reveals the difficulty experienced
by persons who relate instinctively, as if personalizing the
condition, in response to seeing another's disfigured face. 0
That many persons naturally avert their gaze from someone
493 (2005) (proposing the idea for an international treaty "that outlaws . . .
species altering procedures-procedures that change the definition of what it
means to be human"); see also George J. Annas, Lori B. Andrews & Rosario M.
Isasi, Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty
Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 153
(2002).
53. See generally Rhonda Gay Hartman, Face Value: Challenges of
Transplant Technology, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2005).
54. See id.
55. Id. at 20, 34; Osborne P. Wiggens et al., On the Ethics of Facial
Transplantation Research, 4 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 5 (2004).
56. Hartman, supra note 53, at 34-35; Wiggens et al., supra note 55.
57. K. Sutherland, D. Renshaw & P.B. Denyer, Automatic Face Recognition,
U. EDINBURGH SCOT. 29, 29-34 (1992).
58. Associated Press, Woman Says 'Merci' After Face Transplant, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec 2, 2005, at Fl.
59. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND
ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 339-40 (1986).
60. See Caroline B. Terwee et al., Facial Disfigurement: Is it in the Eye of
the Beholder? A Study in Patients with Graves' Ophthalmopathy, 58 CLINICAL
ENDOCRINOLOGY 192 (2003).
[Vol: 47
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who is disfigured strengthens a bond of "fellow-feeling,"6'
thereby deepening a sense of shared humanity that is
sensitive to another's suffering.
Facial transplants are intended for a select group of
patients "with conditions that cannot be adequately
addressed by conventional reconstructive surgery
"62procedures, and promise revolutionary advances in
repairing faces disfigured by disease or trauma.63 Surgeons
harvest facial tissue from deceased donors for transplant onto
disfigured persons.64 Present reconstructive surgical methods
require multiple skin grafts taken from other areas of the
patient's body, resulting in a mask-like appearance.65
Surgeons envision that transplants will lead to improved
bodily functions such as closing eyes and facial expressions
that communicate emotions and feelings, as well as enhanced
aesthetic appearances. 61 The first partial face transplant
recipient demonstrates what pioneering surgeons have
maintained-that the patient will neither look like her former
self nor the donor, instead adopting a "hybrid" appearance.67
Considering whether facial transplant surgery, a non-
lifesaving medical procedure, affronts human dignity is
critical for determining whether it should continue to
advance-and, more importantly, how it should advance.
Could it be used, and should it be permitted, as a step toward
yet another purely aesthetic procedure?6" While facial
transplants pose restorative promise for dignifying life, their
unfettered use implicates myriad concerns regarding human
dignity. These concerns may be clustered according to donor
61. NUSSBAUM, supra note 59, at 374-76.
62. Francois Petit et al., Face Transplantation: Where Do We Stand?, 113
PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 1429, 1432 (2004).
63. See Okie, supra note 18; ROYAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS OF ENG., FACIAL
TRANSPLANTATION: A WORKING REPORT 337 (2004), available at
http://www.rcseng.ac.uk/publications/docs/facialtransplantation.html
(hereinafter FACIAL TRANSPLANTATION).
64. See Okie, supra note 18.
65. See Petit et al., supra note 62, at 1429; FACIAL TRANSPLANTATION, supra
note 63, at 330-31.
66. See Laurent A. Lantieri et al., Face Transplantation: The View from
Paris, France, 99 S. MED. J. 421, 422 (2006); Petit et al., supra note 62, at 1430.
67. Okie, supra note 18, at 893; FACIAL TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 63,
at 332.
68. See Ruth La Ferla & Natasha Singer, The Face of the Future, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at G1.
20071
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
and recipient.
A. Donor-Related Concerns
1. Donative Process
The removal of facial tissue suggests a metaphysical
removal of a decedent's identity, coarsening an intimate
component of human life.69 The visual, identifying tissue of a
human face is deeply personal. 70  Dignity is implicated for
persons close to a potential donor; they may be ill at ease with
donating the decedent's facial tissue.7' Inasmuch as family
bonds with the deceased are linked to a comfort found in
genetic similarity, removing the facial tissue deepens that
sense of loss and possibly impedes the grieving process.72
Thus, surgeons' methods in approaching and engaging
families in a donative decision-making process require careful
consideration: the sensitivity to the personal loss must be
balanced against altruistic donation so as to not erode public
trust in medical morality and competency.73
Additionally, possible perceptions of corpse mistreatment
must not escape consideration. Corpse mistreatment, also
known as mutilation, is recognized as a basis for legal
recourse and imposition of criminal penalties in both
statutory and common law. 74  The Supreme Court likewise
directed that dignity commands minimizing mutilation and
distortion of the human body.75 From a donative discussion
standpoint, bodily mutilation and dismemberment fears are
the most difficult obstacles to overcome.76 Resentment and
69. See Hartman, supra note 53, at 19-20.
70. See id. at 20.
71. See id. at 27.
72. See id. at 29-30.
73. See Ziv M. Peled & Julian J. Pribaz, Face Transplantation: The View
from Harvard Medical School, 99 S. MED. J. 414, 415 (2006) (reinforcing the
importance of public trust in the medical profession).
74. See In re Tri-State Crematory Litig., 215 F.R.D. 660 (N.D. Ga. 2003);
Christensen v. Super. Ct., 54 Cal. 868 (1991); Williams v. City of Minneola, 575
So. 2d 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also COL. REV. STAT. § 18-13-101
(2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7027 (1984); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5510 (West
2004); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.08 (Vernon 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-
704 (2004).
75. See Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1085 (1985).
76. Margaret Verble & Judy Worth, Fears and Concerns Expressed by
Families in the Donation Discussion, 10 PROGRESS IN TRANSPLANTATION 48, 53-
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revulsion could plausibly result from any request of a family
for their deceased relative's facial tissue; such a backlash
could also galvanize sentiment against gifts of the body
generally.7 7 Moreover, a surviving spouse or relative might
conceivably assert an interest in how the tissue is used due to
its personal, visual nature. Should survivors be able to insist
on a "deserving" recipient, i.e., a good person? Those
possibilities highlight the potential difficulties inherent in a
donative decision-making process about facial tissue and the
adequacy of tissue supply, especially given anecdotal findings
that public support of facial transplants does not currently
coincide with donative inclination.78
2. Donative Intent
Unlike the "presumed" consent for tissue donation in
several European countries,79 public policy governing organ
donation in the United States prefers prior expressions of a
donor's intent. This policy engenders dignity that is found in
the meaning derived from personal decisions about gifts of
the body. 0 In the absence of previously expressed intent,
families may decide whether to donate a relative's tissue."
Yet the intimate nature of facial tissue-the personage it
represents-suggests that only a donor's clear, pre-mortem
expression of donative intent should suffice. 2 Because the
nature of donation is closely bound with one's persona and is
powerfully symbolic of self-giving, the donation of facial tissue
should result solely from the personal meaning found in this
gift of the body. 3
54 (2000).
77. Indeed, salvageable lives are lost primarily due to the insufficient
supply of donor organs despite transplant success. See UNITED NETWORK FOR
ORGAN SHARING, WAITING LIST DEATHS AND DEATH RATES: 1995 vS. 2003,
http://www.unos.org/SharedContentDocuments/Waiting-list deathsandrates_
1995_2003.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2006); see also Richard A. Epstein, Organ
Transplants: Is Relying on Altruism Costing Lives?, AM. ENTERPRISE, OctJNov.
1993, at 50.
78. Charles Siebert, Making Faces, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, § 6
(Magazine), at 34.
79. See Okie, supra note 18, at 893.
80. See Hartman, supra note 53, at 21-22.
81. See id. at 23.
82. See id. at 26-27.
83. See id. at 27.
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Any removal of facial tissue for transplant purposes,
absent evidence of the decedent's pre-mortem donative intent,
arguably entails mutilation of the deceased that is degrading
to human dignity. Social norms embodied in laws express
reverence for human remains.' Indeed, dignity's significance
is universally understood in the treatment of human remains,
and constitutes the common denominator amidst cross-
cultural variance in acts demonstrating "last respects."85
Although one prospective face transplant recipient
surmised that donors "wouldn't lose anything,"8 6 the loss,
however non-tangible, is real. Removing a face, given its
symbolic nature and the personage it represents, without
previously expressed permission from the decedent, debases
surviving dignity interests that translate to the living.87 The
deceased's surviving interests in his remains merit legal
protection. 8  A dignitary property interest, for example,
would afford post-mortem dignity beyond the legal fiction of
protection provided by tort and criminal laws with regard to
the sensibilities of survivors. 89  Dignity, pre- and post-
mortem, is not and must not be extinguishable or expendable;
it must endure as the "proud hallmark of our law."90
A closely associated though distinct question is whether
donative intent should be broadened to include the reasons
behind a donor's pre-mortem expression of donative intent.
In other words, given the personal, symbolic nature of facial
84. See id. at 19-23.
85. Compare In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978)
(recognizing well-settled policies that a person, once buried, should not be
exhumed absent compelling reasons, and that there should be a "reverent
regard" for human remains), with David F. Salisbury, Giving Cannibalism a
Human Face, EXPLORATION, Aug. 15, 2001,
http'//www.exploration.vanderbilt.edu/news/news-cannibalism.htm (arguing
that post-mortem cannibalism can have positive meanings and motives based
on culture and experiences).
86. See David Jones, The Haunting Story of the Incredible Woman Who
Could be Given the World's First Face Transplant, DAILY MAIL (London), June
19, 2004, at ED10.
87. See Hartman, supra note 53, at 27.
88. I have argued elsewhere for development of a property interest in
dignity and identity apart from any ownership interest in objects, regardless of
the perceived connection with us, in contrast to the position put forth by
Margaret Jane Radin. See id. at 33-35; Margaret Jane Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
89. Hartman, supra note 53, at 33.
90. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 152 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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tissue, should the donor's motivation matter? Altruistic
motivation driving a decision to donate facial tissue to
someone suffering with disfigurement suggests human
dignity, in contrast to donation predicated on quietistic,
thoughtless acquiescence. Dignity is found in a sense of
service and spiritual rewards that improve others' lives and
promote the common good.9' Facial tissue donation seems
consistent with dignity and therefore morally justified when,
following introspection and reflection, persons divine meaning
in decision making about the nature of this donation. In this
way, facial tissue donation translates beyond the donor to
humanity, thereby reflecting the moral reasoning that
distinguishes humankind.92
B. Recipient-Related Concerns
1. Consent Considerations
A persistent concern is whether prospective patients,
however willing, should be permitted to undergo invasive,
risk-laden, non-essential procedures with uncertain results.
While functional and aesthetic improvements are the clear
aims of facial transplantation, less clear is whether those
benefits can be achieved maximally.93 Requiring a person's
consent prior to any surgical procedure is grounded in human
dignity-personal decision making about bodily integrity
must be respected.94
Yet, informed consent for invasive, innovative surgeries,
such as facial transplants, has received minimal policy
attention. As a result, laws regarding surgical procedures
generally lag behind their advancements. Existing tort
theories, such as negligence, are not necessarily transferable
to an experimental surgery because standards of competent
surgery are not and cannot be established until after patients
undergo them.95 Despite the limited success with partial face
91. HENRY K. BEECHER, RESEARCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL: HUMAN STUDIES
47-62 (1970); see also Hartman, supra note 53, at 14-15 (stating that altruistic
meaning and participating in something beyond one's self "cannot be devalued
as contributing to personal welfare").
92. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
93. Okie, supra note 18, at 893.
94. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2004).
95. Peled & Pribaz, supra note 73, at 415 (acknowledging that information
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transplants, "current immunologic protocols fall miserably
short in preventing both acute and chronic rejection."96 The
face transplant recipient's immune system can reject the
"new face" at any time,97 leaving the recipient in a worse
position than having never undergone the transplant.
98
Consequently, surgeons in several European countries and
the United States have qualms about continued advancement
until a remedy for tissue rejection is established. 99 Bound by
their Hippocratic Oath, surgeons theoretically act primarily
for a patient's benefit. 00 In promoting beneficence (well-
being) and minimizing harm (nonmaleficence), physicians
owe a fiduciary duty to their patients that includes refraining
from exploiting the latter's vulnerability for personal or
professional gain and avoiding serious exposure to risk
whenever possible.0 1
Facial transplants, like other innovative microsurgical
procedures, proceed largely under guidance from national
about facial transplantation "cannot be gained without actually performing the
procedure").
96. Walton & Levin, supra note 51, at 417; see also Francois Petit, Antoine
Paraskevas & Laurent Lantieri, A Surgeons' Perspective on the Ethics of Face
Transplantation, 4 AM. J. BIOETHICS 14, 14-16 (2004); FACIAL
TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 63, at 332-34.
97. Lawrence K. Altman, A Pioneering Transplant, and Now an Ethical
Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2005, at Fl.
98. According to surgeons:
The failed facial transplant patient would potentially go from a stable,
albeit nonideal state with a facial disfigurement, to an extensive,
unstable wound that would require another transplant or significant,
multistage reconstruction to correct, thus leaving the patient more
scarred, both physically and psychologically, than before. Given that
skin has the highest antigenicity of all tissues, this scenario is quite
plausible.
Peled & Pribaz, supra note 73, at 415.
99. The English Position: Position Paper of the Royal College of Surgeons of
England, 99 S. MED. J. 431 (2006); The French Position: Comitg Consultatif
National d Ethique pour les sciences de la vie et de la santg:
"L'allotransplantation de tissu composite (ATC) au niveau de la face (Greffe
totale ou partielle d'un visage)" ["Composite Tissue Allografttransplantation
(CTA) of the Face (Total or Partial Graft)"], 99 S. MED. J. 432 (2006); United
States Position, supra note 18.
100. See STEVEN H. MILES, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH AND THE ETHICS OF
MEDICINE (2004); see also United States Position, supra note 18 ("The ethics of
inflicting an untried, and potentially fatal or deforming remedy for the purpose
of advancing science must be carefully weighed against the Hippocratic credo of
doing no harm.").
101. See Peled & Pribaz, supra note 73, at 414-16; see also Moore v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
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consensus organizations, but such organizations lack the
authority to enforce sanctions. 10 2 Thus, surgeons primarily
determine whether it is ethically sound to allow patients to
undergo procedures with both known and unknown
consequences. 10 3 At a minimum, surgical procedures should
be validated by research before they become routinely used. °4
The current lack of rigorous oversight of innovative surgeries
stands in stark contrast to the strict regulation of
pharmaceuticals as they progress from experimental stages to
public use.'0 Self-imposed guidelines for facial transplant
advancement, such as those adopted by the American Society
for Reconstructive Microsurgery and the American Society of
Plastic Surgeons, 0 6 recommend standards for informed
consent and scrutiny of procedures by specially constituted
boards. 107 However, these organizational boards endorse such
guidelines with broad discretion and without legal
enforcement power.
Moreover, competing regional 0 8  and professional
interests'0 9 that accompany high-profile surgeries can obscure
careful evaluation of the benefit to risk ratio. This signals the
increased possibility of overestimating benefits and
102. See Angelique M. Reitsma & Jonathan D. Moreno, Ethical Regulations
for Innovative Surgery: The Last Frontier?, 194 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 792, 792-93
(2002).
103. David C. Cronin II et al., Transplantation of Liver Grafts from Living
Donors into Adults-Too Much, Too Soon, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1633, 1636
(2001) (articulating the necessity of regulatory oversight for patient protection).
104. See FACIAL TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 63, at 330; United States
Position, supra note 18.
105. See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL
RESEARCH 4-8 (1986); see also Amer S. Ahmed, Note, The Last Twist of the
Knife: Encouraging the Regulation of Innovative Surgical Procedures, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1529, 1536 (2005); Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 102, at 792-
801.
106. See FACIAL TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 63.
107. Okie, supra note 18, at 894.
108. See China 'Does a Face Transplant,' DAILY MAIL (London), Apr. 15,
2006, at 47 (touting "China's growing scientific prowess" with this seminal
surgery).
109. Intense focus on forging ahead with facial transplant surgery can
compromise surgeons' abilities to appreciate related multidisciplinary
considerations and to place patients' health and well-being above professional
ambitions. See Walton & Levin, supra note 51, at 417 (admonishing the "self-
aggrandizement" of the French team in the "exuberance to become the 'first' to
perform hand transplant"); Ahmed, supra note 105, at 1539 (describing the
personal and professional inclination of medical practitioners "to plow ahead
with previously untested practices").
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underestimating risks, and stultifies careful consideration of
issues in public policy, law, and research ethics.1 ° Issues in
research ethics include the safety and efficacy of innovative
surgeries, as well as surgeon involvement in brokering
commercial arrangements that allow patients and doctors to
share in proceeds of profitable photos and videos of the
procedures."' Federal regulatory standards governing
clinical research do not necessarily apply to innovative
surgeries, further lessening the opportunity for adequate
assessment of surgical protocols and tolerable risks."2
Serious psychological and physical risks accompany facial
transplants, including the side effects resulting from the
immunosuppressive drugs that are necessary following
composite tissue allograft. 13  Additionally, long-term
ramifications remain unknown and lessen the justification for
proceeding with risk-replete, non-essential surgery. While
living with a disfigured face is functionally and psychosocially
difficult,"' the condition does not affect general health, unlike
a failing heart or liver. In contrast to organ transplant
candidates, face transplant candidates have other viable
options, such as an autologous skin graft."5 Aside from the
substantial risks, the idea of voluntary, informed decision
making about facial transplants seems at odds with patient
desperation and despair. The "I want it, I want it!" approach
110. Corresponding concerns are found in George J. Annas, Biotechnology
and Public Policy: Professional Self-Regulation, in PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW
BIOTECHNOLOGIES (2004).
111. Dr. Bernard Devauchelle, the surgeon who performed the first partial
facial transplant in Amiens, France, has reportedly been criticized for brokering
commercial arrangements "in which exclusive rights for photographs and video
of the operation were given to Microsoft's Corbis photo agency under an
agreement that allows [the patient, Isabelle Dinoire] to share in the proceeds
from the materials' sale." Craig S. Smith, As Patient Mends, Transplant Uproar
Builds: Questions Aimed at French Doctor, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 14, 2005,
at 2.
112. See Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 102, at 793-94.
113. See, e.g., Xavier Bosch, Surgeon Denied Ethics Approval for Face
Transplantation, 363 LANCET 871, 871 (2004); Jocalyn Clark, Face Transplants
Technically Possible, but "Very Hazardous," 170 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 323 (2004);
FACIAL TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 63, at 332-34; Petit et al., supra note 62,
at 1430-32.
114. J.A. Butler, Social Anxiety in Patients with Facial Disfigurement, 177
BRIT. J PSYCHIATRY 86, 86 (2000).
115. Peled & Pribaz, supra note 73, at 414-16; see also Hartman, supra note
53, at 10, 16.
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of a face transplant candidate when she learned of its mere
prospect' 16  dramatically underscores whether informed
consent in the conventional sense is possible. 117
Human dignity is central to legal as well as ethical
concerns for informed medical decision making."" Dignitary
offenses, embodied in the torts of assault, battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy, are
implicated" 9 and further underscore a need to fashion
protocols for decision-making processes with facial transplant
patients. Any decisional process assumes a threshold
capacity for choosing among available options following a
doctor's disclosure of information about benefits, risks, and
alternatives to recommended treatments or procedures.
Underlying this process is the idea of freedom in fostering
one's values and preferences. This raises a question about
how surgeons should facilitate the consent process with facial
transplant patients. The decision-making process for facial
transplants merits particularized attention because, inter
alia, the procedure's novel character makes it difficult to
protect patient privacy in the decision-making process due to
heightened public curiosity and media scrutiny.
In order to preserve human dignity, should we intervene
to prevent vulnerable disfigured persons from undergoing
risk-replete invasive surgery?120 Interfere with surgeons who
advance it? Conscribe personal choice when biomedical
116. See Jones, supra note 86, at ED10.
117. See Peled & Pribaz, supra note 73, at 415 ("[T]he patients who might
consider having this procedure are exactly the ones who might be least able to
cope psychologically with their disfigurement.").
118. See PHYSICIAN AND PHILOSOPHER-THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION
OF MEDICINE: ESSAYS BY DR. EDMUND PELLEGRINO (Roger J. Bulger & John P.
McGovern eds., 2001); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT
(1984).
119. See Alan Meisel, A "Dignitary Tort" as a Bridge Between the Idea of
Informed Consent and the Law of Informed Consent, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH
CARE 210, 211-14 (1988).
120. In other realms, laws restrain personal and professional decision
making that contravene public sensibilities about preserving human dignity.
See, e.g., Gilles Lebreton, Conseil D'Ettat, 13 RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY 177 (1996)
(Fr.) (invoking police power to prohibit dwarf tossing on the ground that it
threatens respect for human dignity necessary to the public order). For a
discussion of the "lancer de nain" case, see Roger Brownsword, Bioethics Today,
Bioethics Tomorrow: Stem Cell Research and the "Dignitarian Alliance," 17
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 15, 29-30 (2003).
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innovation denigrates dignity?121 Closer scrutiny of decisional
capacity in this context is warranted due to the potential for
the particularly pernicious exploitation of vulnerable
disfigured persons. Patient vulnerability can vitiate
decisional capability for consenting to any surgical procedure,
let alone an experimental one. The very patients for whom
composite tissue allograft is advanced often experience
psychological difficulties borne by their disfigurement; they
suffer from conditions that severely impair their overall
functioning and quality of life. 22
Vulnerability stems from a sense of helplessness and
disempowerment. The despair and desperation
accompanying disfigurement suggest that face transplant
patients are susceptible to external influence and
exploitation. 123 Yet these concerns may properly be addressed
not by means of categorical exclusion from deciding whether
to undergo innovative surgery, but rather through
established standards of individualized patient assessment.
Through such a process, physicians and oversight boards
could evaluate the degree and type of vulnerability concerns
on a case-by-case basis. In that way, the consent process may
be tailored to a specific patient, thereby enabling dignity in
the pursuit of one's own ends by confirming one's inherent
value through autonomous decision making.1 24
121. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 49 (discussing circumstances in which
individual choices regarding biotechnology may entail negative externalities
and worsen society).
122. According to one source:
These patients may also be the ones most likely to be more severely
traumatized by bumps in the road such as the need for increased
immunosuppression postoperatively or the development of a cutaneous
malignancy. If such an event occurs, this same person might also be
more likely to be noncompliant with their immunosuppressive regimen,
thus leading to graft rejection.
Peled & Pribaz, supra note 73, at 415; see also Robert Newell & Isaac Marks,
Phobic Nature of Social Difficulty in Facially Disfigured People, 176 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 177 (2000).
123. Carol Levine et al., The Limitations of "Vulnerability" as a Protection for
Human Research Participants, 4 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44, 44-49 (2004).
124. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (ascribing
dignity to the concept of agreement and consent); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (equating decision-making empowerment
with human dignity). Dignity through autonomous choice that results from an
informed consent process may be contrasted with personal requests for
assistance in suicide. The latter seems "less a tribute to autonomy than an
expression, intended or not, of a person's social devaluation and lack of dignity"
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If, for example, prospective face transplant patients
understand the risk of harm and are able to tolerate failure of
the surgical procedure, their opportunity to exercise
autonomous choice to participate in the surgery could reduce
their vulnerability by providing them with an invigorated
sense of hope and control. 25 Beyond functional difficulties
such as closing one's eyes to sleep, 26 facially disfigured
persons experience loneliness and isolation more acutely than
non-disfigured persons. 127 They also tend to perceive
themselves as being on the fringe of humanity, shunned from
"human" inclusion. 128 Others' reactions to their disfigurement
often deepen this perception and sense of exclusion. 129 As
someone suffering with disfigurement attested, "We don't go
out because of the way we look .... So disfigured people just
shut themselves away. They only leave home at night with
hoods over their faces. For them, face transplants could mean
a chance at a normal life." 3 ° This testament demonstrates
the despair and desire of disfigured persons to regain
normalcy by looking human again.
Facial transplantation's transforming promise to restore
appearance and provide respite from the physical and
psychological pain of disfigurement must not be devalued
when assessing whether patients can capably consent. Nor
should the dignity found in an altruistic desire to temper
others' painful afflictions be undervalued when determining
whether a patient is decisionally capable of undergoing a
facial transplant. Thus, permitting a patient to consent to
because such requests suggest "a desperate search not just for social support,
but for social confirmation of one's genuine, inherent value or dignity as a
human person." R. George Wright, Consenting Adults: The Problem of
Enhancing Human Dignity Non-Coercively, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1397, 1409 (1995)
(applying a Kantian concept of human dignity and rational choice).
125. Lawrence K. Altman, Woman Opted for Transplant as Method to Mend
Face, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005, at A12.
126. See Petit et al., supra note 62, at 143; see also Jones, supra note 86
(interviewing Jacqui Saburido, who struggles with facial disfigurement).
127. Newell & Marks, supra note 122, at 180; Maria T. Miliora, Facial
Disfigurement: A Self-Psychological Perspective on the "Hide-and-Seek" Fantasy
of an Avoidant Personality, 62 BULL. MENNIGER CLINIC 378 (1998).
128. See F. Coull, Personal Story Offers Insight into Living with Facial
Disfigurement, 12 J. WOUND CARE 254 (2003).
129. Newell & Marks, supra note 122, at 179-81.
130. Peter Gorer, Surgery's Next Step: Face Transplants, CHI. TRIB., June
12, 2005, at C1.
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facial transplant surgery is not intrinsically demeaning to
human dignity, but it is demeaning if a patient's vulnerability
makes him susceptible to coercion or exploitation. Judgments
made about patient vulnerability and any vitiating impact on
a patient's decision-making capacity must be made not on the
ground of vulnerability per se, but on an individualized basis
after a careful evaluation of a particular patient's
vulnerability.131 There is dignity in personal judgment and
the pursuit of one's own ends. In the context of facial
transplants, patients should be able to choose to collaborate
in clinical innovation. As the Supreme Court recognized, the
concept of "agreement and consent should be given a weight
and dignity of its own."132
2. Selection Considerations
As facial transplant procedures progress, criteria for
selecting the recipients become particularly important. Some
contend that facial transplants should be reserved for those
suffering from severe disfigurement as a result of disease or
trauma. 133 This notion raises the issue of defining what
constitutes disfigurement. While research suggests that a
universal concept of disfigurement exists, degrees of
disfigurement may still be influenced by systematic and
subjective elements.1 34  Disfigurement, like disability, is
primarily a social construction shaped by cultural norms. 35
Given the perception that facial transplants are meant
for patients who cannot be remedied by conventional
131. See Nancy S. Jecker, Protecting the Vulnerable, 4 AM. J. BIOETHICS 60,
60-62 (2004); see also United States Position, supra note 18, at 430
(contradicting the notion that facially disfigured patients are "markedly
impaired" by citing to studies confirming "that the severity of deformity does not
necessarily correlate with distress"); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed
Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900-01 (1994) (deriving dignity from deference to
personal choices).
132. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002).
133. See Lantieri, supra note 66, at 422 ("Face transplantation should be
considered a potential medical solution to provide relief to suffering for a few
number of patients. This suffering comprises physical distortions and functional
disabilities that lead to social exclusion and psychological repercussions."); Petit
et al., supra note 62, at 1432.
134. Terwee et al., supra note 60, at 196-98.
135. See Adrienne Asch, Distracted by Disability, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH
CARE ETHICS 77, 77-87 (1998).
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reconstructive surgeries,136 human dignity should limit the
procedure to only those persons for whom transplanting facial
tissue would restore both a sense of being and normal
functionalities. Severely burned, featureless, and virtually
faceless persons would be eligible to receive facial transplants
under such a policy; these are, after all, the persons inspiring
this innovative procedure. Limiting the use of facial
transplants in this way maintains dignity because it benefits
people without derogating the symbolic value of the face and
the core aspect of humankind it represents.
In contrast, broadening the pool of potential facial
transplant recipients could lead to a scarcity of donor tissue
and related medical resources, with wealthier persons
utilizing the procedure for identity makeovers or as a remedy
for unsatisfying cosmetic surgery.137  Among the
considerations that compel our attention, which include fair
access to medical procedures and a corrosion of norms
defining medicine's role, is a class-based gentrification that
could conceivably result between those who have access to
sophisticated surgical techniques and those who do not.
Facial transplantation should not be permitted to become the
next facelift or other enhancement procedure and derogate
the face's symbolic meaning. Rather, it should be reserved for
reconstructive purposes in order to prevent the depravation of
human dignity and the depletion of skills that are
instrumental to medicine's determinant end, which is to
repair and restore natural human functions.
138
Moreover, the misuse of facial transplantation could
erode the mystique that qualities revered in human existence
are not manufactured.'39 By suggesting an aversion to self-
136. Okie, supra note 18, at 890; Petit et al., supra note 62, at 1432.
137. La Ferla & Singer, supra note 68, at G7. See Susan Saulny, After
Cosmetic Surgery, The 'Do Over,' N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at G2.
138. Pharmaceuticals, too, should be reserved for reparative purposes.
Propranolol, for example, demonstrates promise for relieving the acute
symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder, and for restoring persons who suffer
with it to their former natural state of functioning. See Peter Gorner, Drug
Eases Pain of Bad Memories, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 2, 2006, at C1. Thus, research on
propranolol should advance for this limited use; it should not be used as a
'mental cosmetic'-"[a] drugO that will allow us to airbrush our identities by
selectively erasing or enhancing memories." James Morgan, A Fix To Forget It:
A Miracle Pill Could Banish Bad Memories. But Is That So Wise?, HERALD
(GLASGOw), Apr. 25, 2006, at 11.
139. See SKINNER, supra note 15, at 53-56.
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worth through imitation and inauthenticity, enhancing
therapies depreciate humanity by abating personal effort and
excellence. Analogously, injecting performance-enhancing
steroids 14  or genetically enhancing embryos -or
purchasing a Nobel Prize-each ineluctably suggests
diminution of human dignity by affording an alternative
explanation "for which the individual himself has previously
been given credit."142 Each lessens a unique, intrinsic value of
persons by making non-meritorious and commensurable that
which had heretofore been considered meritorious and
noncommensurable. 143  Enhancement surgeries also reduce
one's chances of being admired for inexplicable qualities
inherent to individuality.'4 While nature's gifts may not be
readily apparent, they should not be eclipsed by impulse of
mastery without inquiry and appreciation. 145  Precisely
because they are not fully understood, human attributes
inspire awe. 46 This notion is bolstered by increasing anti-
140. See Donna Tommelleo, Ruth's Family Gives Bonds Cold Shoulder,
PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, May 11, 2006, at C-1 (reporting reaction by Babe
Ruth's family members in response to Barry Bonds' second place stature in the
all-time home run rankings).
141. See Daniel L. Tobey, What's Really Wrong with Genetic Enhancement: A
Second Look at Our Posthuman Future, 6 YALE J.L. & TECH. 54, 125-26 (2004)
(describing enhancement as shifting our potential rather than maximizing it).
"[Elnhancement shifts our natural mode of valuing one another in the personal,
familial sphere away from process orientation and towards product-orientation."
Id.
142. SKINNER, supra note 15, at 59.
143. KANT, supra note 41, at 45-54; SKINNER, supra note 15, at 49-53.
144. See SKINNER, supra note 15, at 56. Literary perspectives likewise
capture this point. See OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY (Isobel
Murray ed., Oxford University Press 1974) (1891). The current by-product of
distortion in self-image is the emergence of "Body Dysmorphic Disorder," see
Lynn G. v. Hugo, 96 N.Y.2d 306, 309 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001), a psychiatric
condition defined as a preoccupation with a slight or imaginary physical
imperfection that causes considerable distress or functional impairment. AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (DSM-IV) 466 (4th ed. 1994); see also Theresamarie Mantese,
Christine Pfeiffer & Jacquelyn McClinton, Cosmetic Surgery and Informed
Consent: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 85 MICH. B.J. 26, 28 (2006),
available at httpJ/www.michbar.orgjournal/pdf/pdf4article957.pdf; Saulny,
supra note 137, at G2.
145. See Michael J. Sandel, Statement at the Meeting of the President's
Council on Bioethics, Session 4: What's Wrong with Enhancement (Dec. 12,
2002), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/transcript/dec02/sessions4.html
(articulating considerations that "combat our tendency.. .to ride roughshod over
the given without interrogating it or appreciating it").
146. See SKINNER, supra note 15, at 53 ("[It is therefore not surprising that
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cosmetic surgery sentiments that intimate societal desire for
elevating individuality's mystique, rather than subjugating it
to mimicry and conformity through surgical measures
embedding the preferences of one generation in the next.14
7
Given that personage and self-worth are, in a
metaphysical sense, imputed to the face, to what extent
should transplant patients be involved in the selection of
donative tissue that is visible? The transplanted tissue
impacts post-surgical recovery by affecting psychological
acclimation and compliance with demanding
immunosuppressive regimens. 48 For example, an early hand
transplant failure was precipitated by the recipient's
noncompliance with immunosuppressive drugs because he
wanted the transplanted hand to be removed. 149
Dignity is further implicated when considering the
psychological impact that is attached to the specific physical
attributes of the selected tissue. In order to maintain human
dignity, standards should be devised for the selection process
related to the recipients-limited solely to those persons
severely disfigured by disease or trauma-as well as for the
selection 5 ' of donor tissue from persons who expressed pre-
mortem intent to give this personal, profound gift of their
body.
The intimate nature of the donative tissue suggests that
a supply surplus is unlikely, and thus, the unsavory prospect
of payment for facial tissue is not implausible.15' Payment for
facial tissue would contravene human dignity given the
tissue's symbolic, personal nature. This reasoning is similar
we are likely to admire behavior more as we understand it less.").
147. See Matthew Westwood, The Ugly Face of Flawless Beauty,
AUSTRALIAN, May 28, 2004, at 14; Mary Tannen, Unnatural Selection, N.Y.
TIMES, May 2, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 78.
148. Peled & Pribaz, supra note 73, at 414-15; Hartman, supra note 53, at 13-
14.
149. See Marco Lanzetta et al., Human Hand Transplantation: What Have
We Learned?, 36 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 664, 668 (2004).
150. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 86 (interviewing a prospective face
transplant recipient, who desired to see pictures of the potential donors with the
option to reject the facial tissue if she "didn't like their appearance, or ... had a
bad feeling about them").
151. See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of
Markets, Tanner Lecture on Human Values at Brasenose College, Oxford (May
11-12, 1998), available at
http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/sandel00.pdf.
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to the salient debasement and dehumanization arguments
central to bans on organ payment. 152 For someone whose face
has been disfigured by trauma or disease, donated facial
tissue that could restore "normal" appearance and social
inclusion would-and should-be priceless in the purest
sense. Accordingly, facial transplants could be a meaningful
step toward restoring a sense of dignity for disfigured
persons.
IV. DIGNITY FOR HUMANITY
Facial transplantation is part of a larger context for
considering the role of biomedicine and its uses. Dignity is
central to exploring whether particular biomedical advances
degrade the intrinsic worth found in humankind. By
implicating the unique attributes of humanity, these
advances should capture societal attention. So, too, is society
responsible both for inquiring into the issues, and for guiding
bio-scientific innovations. The discharge of this responsibility
requires society to demarcate the boundaries of humanity in
the face of biomedical transgressions.
A. Biomedical Strides, Law, and Policy
The strides in genetic engineering 153 require us to
consider their effects on humanity with dignity in mind-
quite literally, what it means to be human and the essential
elements that comprise humanity. Among those strides, the
process of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is
illustrative.' Although understanding a genetic profile
152. Hartman, supra note 53, at 23-26.
153. See Sharon Begley, Now that Chimeras Exist, What if Some Turn Out
Too Human?, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2005, at B1 (quoting Henry T. Greely, who
said, "The centaur has left the barn . . . ."). For other viewpoints, see, for
example, FUKUYAMA, supra note 49, and Richard Posner, Book Review, Animal
Rights, 110 YALE L.J. 527 (2000).
154. Following fertilization of gametes in vitro and prior to implantation of
the embryos in a woman's uterus, the embryos are genetically screened so that
parents may decide which embryos to implant. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF
HAPPINESS (2003); Francis Collins, Statement at the Meeting of the President's
Council on Bioethics, Session 5: Genetic Enhancement: Current and Future
Prospects (Dec. 13, 2002), available at
httpJ/bioethicsprint.bioethics.gov/transcripts/decO2/session5.html. For an
analysis about the uses and implications of PGD, see Note, Regulating
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: The Pathologization Problem, 118 HARV. L.
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presumably enhances humankind, PGD generates concerns
about defining its "proper" and "therapeutic" uses, 155 as well
as determining which characteristics are "unacceptable
deviations and disabilities."1 56  PGD's use gives rise to
potential individual and social harms, and to serious
questions regarding what information prospective parents
may rely upon in their preimplantation decision making. 15 7
That which appears reasonable on an individualized basis
may be problematic from a collectivized societal standpoint,
leading to impenetrable class chasms. 5 "
Neuroscience's demystification of the inner workings of
the human mind,'59 however noble an endeavor,"6 similarly
requires careful scrutiny. Recent advances have dramatically
improved our understanding of brain function, giving rise to
numerous ethical implications.' 6 ' As a result, "neuroethics" is
rapidly developing into a major field in its own right, as new
neuroscientific techniques continue to cast light on human
behavior'62  and invite inquiry into brain imaging's
implications that include our concepts of personal
responsibility and free will. 163
Neuroscientific strides also generate the prospect of
synthesizing humans with machines, thereby creating a new
organism.'l 4  Human-machine hybrids present questions
REV. 2770 (2005) (hereinafter Regulating Preimplantation).
155. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 154; Collins, supra
note 154. See generally Adrienne Asch, Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective
Abortion: A Challenge to Practice and Policy, in THE DOUBLE-EDGED HELIX:
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETICS IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (Joseph S. Alper et
al. eds., 2002).
156. See Asch, supra note 135, at 77-87.
157. Regulating Preimplantation, supra note 154; Jason Christopher Roberts,
Customizing Conception: A Survey of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and the
Resulting Social, Ethical, and Legal Dilemmas, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12.
158. Regulating Preimplantation, supra note 154, at 2777-78.
159. For erudite explorations of neuroscience and its dimensions, see, for
example, KANDEL, supra note 7, and WILSON, supra note 7.
160. See Charlie Rose, interview with James Watson, Chancellor, Cold
Springs Harbor Laboratories, & Edward Wilson, Professor, Harvard University
(PBS television broadcast Dec. 14, 2005).
161. See KANDEL, supra note 7; Neuroscience transcript, supra note 9.
162. See NEUROETHICS, supra note 8; Jonathan D. Moreno, Neuroethics: An
Agenda for Neuroscience and Society, 4 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 149, 153
(2003).
163. See Robin Marantz Henig, Looking for the Lie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006,
§6 (Magazine), at 47.
164. See generally RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN
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about personhood-what comprises it, along with the allegory
of rights ascribed to human gradations. 165  These questions
suggest consideration of whether dignity constitutes a
protectible penumbral right within the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of liberty.166 Another consideration is
whether such hybrids implicate a form of enslavement within
the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment's proscription of
dehumanization. 167
The trajectory for anti-aging technologies continues to
unfold as well, notably nanotechnology for re-engineering and
re-creating human biological systems at the molecular
level. 68  Put simply, a side effect of curing and preventing
debilitating diseases is significant life-span extension.
Insofar as technology is aimed at forestalling death, the
prospects for living not just longer, but indefinitely, are
inescapable, 169 altering a natural cycle of human evolution 70
and prompting consideration as to whether (and to what
extent) its course should be directed.' 7'
The reasonable goals of reducing premature death and
compressing morbidity notwithstanding, 172 a research agenda
HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY (2005); RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL
MACHINES: WHEN COMPUTERS EXCEED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (1999).
165. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial
Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231 (1992).
166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (prohibiting deprivation of liberty by the
government without due process of law).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (proscribing slavery or involuntary servitude,
whether by private or public action, and giving Congress plenary power to
enforce it); see also Amar & Widawsky, supra note 35.
168. RAY KURZWEIL & TERRY GROSSMAN, FANTASTIC VOYAGE: LIVE LONG
ENOUGH TO LIVE FOREVER (2004); see also Mark A. Lemley, Patenting
Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 602 (2005); Glenn Harlan Reynolds,
Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy: Three Futures, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
179, 181-87 (2003).
169. See Callahan, supra note 10; John Harris, Intimations of Immortality,
288 SCIENCE 59, 59 (2000); Sherwin Nuland, Do You Want to Live Forever?, 108
TECH. REV. 36 (2005).
170. See Steven Goldberg, The Changing Face of Death: Computers,
Consciousness, and Nancy Cruzan, 43 STAN. L. REV. 659 (1991); see also
Callahan, supra note 10, at 655 (noting increased difficulty in distinguishing
living and dying).
171. See Harris, supra note 169, at 59 (urging us to "start thinking now about
how we can live decently and creatively with the prospect of such lives").
172. "Compression of morbidity" is defined as "a shortening of the period of
poor health before death." Callahan, supra note 10, at 655. Although the idea
behind it has been around for several hundred years, only in recent years has
there been any evidence of achievement. Id.
[Vol: 47
FACE OF DIGNITY
and technological advancements directed at increasing life
expectancy may bring about unparalleled problems of
"mortals" versus "immortals ."173 Configuring a dignity-based
policy framework for overseeing those advancements and
foreseeing related problems now could lessen the necessity of
making intolerable choices later.174 The radical extension of
life is destined to make any conceptualization of natural
death difficult, raising uncertainty about how humankind will
value the living.
While the challenges are unprecedented, they are not
meaningfully different in terms of their challenge to
humanity. They suggest a more designed, mechanical human
structure and evolution; they also suggest the need for a
normative and less mechanical analysis. A deontological,
dignity-based framework should be applied to sort out and
determine the implications for humanity. While bio-scientific
advances are stimulating, their acceleration must not outpace
public deliberation.
B. The Need for Principled Public Oversight
Although technological strides strengthen our sense of
shared humanity, their rapid nature has prevented adequate
opportunity for public policy guidance. The increasing
prevalence of genetic testing and screening, along with
experimental, innovative surgeries with virtually no
regulatory oversight, underscore this point. Scientific strides
may astonish us, but they must not shunt public discourse
and policy analysis when the potential for the disintegration
of unique human attributes exists.
173. See Aubrey D.N.J. de Grey, Life Extension, Human Rights, and the
Rational Refinement of Repugnance, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 659, 659 (2005); Harris,
supra note 169, at 59.
174. As John Harris explains:
[We might be facing a future in which the most ethical course is a sort
of generational cleansing. This would involve deciding collectively how
long it is reasonable for people to live in each generation, and trying to
ensure that as many as possible live healthy lives of that length. We
would then have to ensure that, having lived a fair inning, they died-
either by suicide or euthanasia, or by programming clls to switch the
aging process on again after a certain time-to make way for future
generations.
Harris, supra note 169, at 59.
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1. Standards for Innovative Surgical Procedures
The tendency to over-prioritize biomedical advancement
correspondingly under-prioritizes patient protection. In
contrast to the scientific realm, where rigorous testing,
refutation and peer review are staples prior to deeming a
hypothesis viable, the lack of an adequate scientific
assessment of surgical innovation pre-performance is a
longstanding norm within the practice of medicine. As facial
transplants demonstrate, innovative surgical procedures tend
to proceed without rigorous testing and regulatory
oversight.17 A year prior to the first partial face transplant
performed in France, the French National Ethics Advisory
Committee found that inherent risks of the procedure made it
unethical.176  This prompted criticism of surgeons who
seemingly bypassed proven procedures and avoided
addressing ethical concerns in a rush to be the first to
perform a face transplant. 77
Consequently, the "standard" practice often emerges after
the experimental procedure has been performed on
patients.1 78  Most innovative surgical techniques, including
allograft transplant techniques for the face and hands,
proceed ad hoc, influenced only by voluntary compliance with
the guidelines from national consensus organizations."' In
contrast to the strict regulation of medical devices as they
progress from innovative stages to general use,
determinations about whether to progress with innovative
surgeries rest primarily with doctors free from oversight.18 0
While patients may be willing to undergo procedures with
175. Peled & Pribaz, supra note 73, at 415-16.
176. Bosch, supra note 113, at 871.
177. Walton & Levin, supra note 51, at 417; Lawrence K. Altman, French, in
First, Use a Transplant to Repair a Face, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at A6; see
also Craig S. Smith, As a Face Transplant Heals, Flurries of Questions Arise:
Doctors Differ on Ethics and Patient's Mental State, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005,
at Al.
178. See Lanzetta et al., supra note 149, at 664. The International Registry
of Hand and Composite Tissue Transplantation, for example, reports on hand
transplant progress and reposits information about composite tissue
transplantation, "thereby providing a unique opportunity for participants to
keep abreast of the latest developments by sharing their experience." Marco
Lanzetta et al., The International Registry on Hand and Composite Tissue
Transplantation, 79 TRANSPLANTATION 1210, 1210 (2005).
179. Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 102, at 792-95.
180. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
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unknown consequences in order to collaborate in clinical
innovation that promises a positive outcome, surgeons must
not abdicate their responsibility to ensure the safety of their
patients. 181
2. Professional and Institutional Oversight
Of no less concern is the existing regulatory gap that
allows surgeons to move ahead with innovative surgeries in
the absence of any, let alone rigorous, public oversight. 18 2
Extant federal regulations impose restrictions on human
subject research, but do not regulate invasive, innovative
surgeries per se.ls3 If surgical procedures are not structured
as research, they may evade federal regulatory oversight
altogether.
Even assuming that surgical techniques are styled as
human subject research within the purview of federal
regulations and IRB review,1" such review does not cover the
entire range of conduct and care appropriate for patients of
innovative surgical procedures. In addition to the structural
and systemic problems endemic to IRB review, 185 the concerns
now raised by biomedical challenges were not contemplated
by the policies on which present federal legislation and
regulations are based.186
More specifically, the concerns presented by biomedical
181. Peled & Pribaz, supra note 73; Petit, Paraskevas, & Lantieri, supra note
96, at 14-16.
182. See Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 102, at 793-95; see also supra notes
102-104 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2004). For one writer's position on this
.murky zone," see Ahmed, supra note 105, at 1537-44, 1561 (providing a
comprehensive discussion of why innovative surgery must be brought into the
regulatory fold).
184. See Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 102, at 793-801.
185. Marginal monitoring processes, insufficient expertise, and conflicts of
interests are among the problems. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS,
REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW
BIOTECHNOLOGIES 201 (2004) (discussing the statement of Ezekiel J. Emanuel
to the Council on September 12, 2002, which identified problems with IRB
review for research involving human embryos); see also U.S. DEP'T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: A TIME FOR REFORM 7-9
(1998); Annas, supra note 52, at 489 (finding IRB safeguards inadequate for
research subjects or society).
186. See National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974). See
also John A. Robertson, The Law of Institutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L.
REV. 484, 485 (1979).
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innovation move beyond safeguarding individual bodily
integrity to species preservation, which was not part of the
policy underlying IRB review.1 17 Thus, elucidating essential
aspects of humankind and determining whether a specific bio-
scientific advance could elementally alter them should not be
entrusted solely to institutional oversight. Rather, the
oversight must be a societal task that reflects a collective
public conscience.
3. Dignity as Central to the Bio-Science-Society Interface
The catalysis for biomedical innovation must result from
collaboration between science and society. Face transplants
present the potential to alleviate suffering and to transform
the lives of a select group of persons for whom current
reconstructive techniques are ineffective. They also implicate
not just individual interests, but societal judgment about
tolerable risk allocation. Thus, public oversight of the
consent process for innovative surgeries, including facial
transplantation, is needed. The unique attributes that
comprise humankind, such as the face and the humanity it
represents, heighten this need. That oversight should include
calibrating in advance the protocols for risk assessments and
how they should be communicated to prospective patients.
Human dignity is the core to a cohesive approach to judge
biomedical progress. Dignity is a powerful lens that enables
us to assess the progression and the crucial challenges ahead.
Societal stewardship is compelled from dignity's time-honored
place in human existence, pre- and post-mortem. 88  It is
critical to undertake a finely-grained inquiry of the gauntlet
of difficult questions presented by technological innovations
through a public vetting process prior to staking out positions
based on pre-conceived notions.8 9
Public deliberation about facial transplantation does not
threaten, but rather, legitimizes-dignifies, if you will-its
progress and use. Society should collaborate with science in a
manner consistent with human dignity in order to guide bio-
scientific progress and usage. This includes sustaining its
187. Hartman, supra note 53, at 35-41.
188. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5510 (West 2004); Dickerson & Assocs. v.
Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995 (Colo. 2001).
189. See Arthur Caplan, Facing Ourselves, 4 AM. J. BIOETHICS 18, 18-20
(2004) (advocating "prophylactic ethics").
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advancement while limiting its clinical application when
appropriate.
The clarification of priorities and issues related to
specific biomedical advances is needed to catalyze public
policy. Identifying relevant interests and framing issues in a
dignity-centered regime are threshold to policy development.
In the context of facial transplantation, defining an interest
in the human face that preserves a value sacrosanct to
personhood is one such priority. Another priority is to enrich
policy through research. Research regarding the
psychological implications of facial transplants on donative
decision making is needed. Also meriting studies are the
psychological impact and behavioral aspects of receiving
another's facial tissue, along with the integration of tissue
symbolic of the decedent's personage. 190
Human dignity is manifested through altruistic donation,
which is the touchstone of existing federal and state
transplant policies. Yet other compelling considerations that
implicate human dignity are notably absent. The symbolic
nature of a face and whether (and how) it should be harvested
for another's use were not considered in developing the
current laws. Indeed, the policies underlying the National
Organ Transplantation Act' and Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act "'92 fail to contemplate the distinct interests that deserve
immediate public discussion and debate.
Because existing laws fail to consider unique issues
related to biomedical innovations such as transplanting facial
tissue, they offer inadequate oversight. Facial
transplantation commands particularized policy development;
the refinement of its scope and use should be a matter of
public discourse. Informed public discussion that defines
priorities and focuses on human dignity should precede any
policy that reflects a collaboration between science and
society. This collaboration is critical for steering progress
when a specific use of biomedical innovation involves
190. Other issues compelling study include "quality of the functional
recovery, aesthetic result, [and] long term outcome of the graft .. " Lantieri,
supra note 66, at 423.
191. See National Organ Transplantation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74 (1994).
192. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993); see also 8A U.L.A. 63
(1993) (providing a table of jurisdictions adopting the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act).
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constituents of humanity. 193
It is a noble calling-public "noblesse oblige" in the best
sense-for society to collaborate meaningfully with scientists,
particularly as innovation increasingly strikes at human
quintessence. Short-term goals and long-term strategies can
be devised for specific biomedical advances through a society-
science collaboration using a dignity-based scheme, rather
than leaving such policy developments to a future generation
when safeguards may no longer be viable.
Biomedical technology affords us the intriguing dilemma
of achieving greater understanding about humankind while
destroying its mystique. Arguments against biotechnological
progress altogether, however, conflict with human dignity.
There is human achievement inherent in explaining the
inexplicable, which, in turn, merits admiration.' That is an
extraordinary thing about science-it takes ideas and gives
them ability. But the ideas must neither be ill conceived nor
ill considered. Society must determine the benefits of them
through a dignity-centered framework that focuses on the
threatened harm to humankind's essential aspects. Specific
uses that fundamentally diminish the value and meaning of
being human should be constrained.
Any inquiry regarding biomedical technology should
examine whether a specific use of it benefits or degrades
humanity, invoking philosophical and jurisprudential ideas
about dignity.'95 Bio-scientific pursuits must not proceed
unguided. However, society must foster bio-scientific inquiry
and innovation, 96 because they promote dignity by enabling
193. See Annas, supra note 14, at 768 (admonishing that "[hiumans must
inform science, science cannot inform (or define) humanity").
194. See SKINNER, supra note 15, at 58 ("Science naturally seeks a fuller
explanation.. . its goal is the destruction of mystery. The defenders of dignity
will protest, but in doing so they postpone an achievement for which, in
traditional terms, man would receive the greatest credit and for which he would
be most admired.").
195. See Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965 (1983); Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693 (1976); see also KANT, supra note 41, at 96-97.
196. For a thought-provoking discussion about scientific inquiry within the
meaning of the federal Constitution, compare James R. Ferguson, Scientific
Inquiry and the First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 639 (1979) (contending
that laws regulating scientific research are constitutionally infirm), with John
A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1977) (defending the constitutionality of laws regulating
scientific research). Additional treatment is found in Barry P. McDonald,
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and empowering humankind. Thus, societal, stewardship
serves as a gateway for scientific ingenuity to optimize
human benefit while safeguarding unique human attributes
threatened by that ingenuity.
Face transplants are paradigmatic for exploring
questions raised by bio-scientific advances that increasingly
implicate humanity and the way we think about the human
state. Informed public examination of a technological
innovation is vitally important for driving its advancement.
Examining dignity-related issues is essential to prevent
undue constraints on what could ultimately prove
revolutionary in enhancing individual lives. A face
transplant's restorative promise is incalculable, as it holds
the potential to instill a sense of self and dignity in a
disfigured person. As such, it should be thought of as an
extraordinary procedure used for a narrow purpose in limited
circumstances given its impact on a core constituent of
humanity-the face.
Facial transplantation has materialized.197 Thus, the
very idea of "transplanting" faces should be taken seriously.
So, too, should the consequences and implications for human
dignity spur public deliberation about the procedure. The
value of the human face to our shared existence is vital to this
deliberation. 9
V. CONCLUSION
Assessing the progress and use of biomedical science
through a dignity-centered analysis may ultimately prove
Nietzsche wrong-we are not destined to transcend human
nature and the moral sense that characterizes our species.199
Government Regulation or Other "Abridgements" of Scientific Research: The
Proper Scope of Judicial Review Under the First Amendment, 54 EMORY L.J.
979 (2005), and Dana Remus Irwin, Freedom of Thought: The First Amendment
and the Scientific Method, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1479.
197. See UK Gets Face Transplant Go-Ahead, BBC NEWS, October 25, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/6083392.stm (reporting that British surgeons
of the Royal Free Hospital in London have received permission from the
National Health Services Ethics Board to proceed in their preparations to
perform the first full face transplant). See also Altman, supra note 177, at A6;
Iain Hutchison, Face Transplants: Is the Genie Out of the Bottle?, 99 S. MED. J.
427, 429 (2006); Joseph Kahn, China: Face Transplant for Victim of a Bear
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, at A5.
198. See Hartman, supra note 53, at 7.
199. See NIETZSCHE, supra note 47.
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Never before has biomedical science demanded more focus on
human dignity. Stunning bio-scientific strides increasingly
strike at the strength of humankind--our unique attributes
and meaning found in human qua human. The increasing
refinement of biomedical technology coupled with a
propensity to destroy human parameters strengthen dignity's
role in assessing biomedical challenges to fundamental
aspects of humankind. By challenging a remaining vestige of
image and identity vital to humankind, facial transplants are
paradigmatic for the importance of a dignity-centered
approach to adjudge biomedical progress and usage.
According to the Supreme Court's unwavering vision of
dignity's shield against the encroachment of humanity's
intrinsic worth, °° it is sensible to think that dignity must be
central to any decisional process about non-essential,
experimental procedures with extensive risks and untold
consequences. As facial transplantation advances, society
must consider the value of a human face and its meaning in
our shared existence. If humanity is dignity, then the face is
its imprimatur.
Constituents that distinguish us as human must be
preserved. Society has a deontological responsibility to
monitor biomedical and surgical advances, particularly the
uses of such advances and whether they unacceptably
transgress constitutive aspects of humanity. This task
cannot-and should not-be entrusted solely to professional
and institutional oversight.
Now more than ever, the transcendent, time-honored
value of dignity should emerge as the standard by which
society navigates technological advances that challenge
humanity with elemental change. Dignity is central to
assessing and preserving qualities distinct to our species. By
protecting human worth against encroachment, dignity
frames the questions that beset us about whether a specific
innovation should advance and how it should be used.
Dignity must also shape our responses.
Dignity deserves far more focus for delineating the scope
and scale of bio-scientific progress. By offering insights into
the importance of dignity, this Essay provides a primer for
200. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721 (1961).
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legal policy analysis related to biomedical innovation.
Human dignity enlightens the issues raised by this
innovation and illuminates the charting of a future course.
No less at stake are the constituents that distinguish
humanity. These must be secured, now and for the future.
We are the stakeholders. For in the end, the face of dignity
is-and should remain-human.

